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Abstract 
Our research examines whether the way in which a person encodes a traumatic experience 
affects their post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and ability to remember the trauma 
over time. In our first study, we were interested in establishing whether people have any existing 
beliefs about how encoding processes influence the development of PTSD. In line with Ehlers 
and Clark’s (2000) theory, we hypothesized that people would be more likely to indicate that 
exclusively paying attention to sensory details during a traumatic event contributes to the 
formation of traumatic memories and PTSD. To test this hypothesis, we designed a simple 
survey asking about people’s beliefs concerning the relationship between encoding and PTSD as 
well as their confidence in those beliefs. In our second study, we examined whether people’s 
encoding strategy when they experience a traumatic event affects their later emotions and their 
ability to remember that trauma over time. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
encoding conditions—control, conceptually driven (process the meanings of the images) or data-
driven (processing the images by focusing on the sensory details)—while they viewed a set of 
traumatic photographs from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Greenwald, 
Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). In Phase 1, participants took a series of baseline mood measures, were 
randomly assigned to an encoding condition, and were shown a series of traumatic photographs. 
Participants also monitored the number of intrusions they experienced and took an immediate 
Old/New memory test. A week later, participants completed Phase 2 involving a second, 
surprise, Old/New memory test. We also assessed participants PTSD symptoms again to see if 
their symptomology increased over the week. We hypothesized that participants in our data-
driven encoding condition would misremember more trauma over time and experience an 
increase in PTSD symptoms (indicating the memory amplification effect). Although our Study 1 
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hypothesis was supported, Study 2 hypotheses were not. Nonetheless, our results provide 
insights into the importance of encoding strategies following exposure to trauma, changes in 
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The Effects of Conceptually Driven Versus Data-Driven 
Encoding in Traumatic Memory Amplification 
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a significant mental health disorder that can 
develop after a highly stressful or life-threatening event, such as a natural disaster, car accident, 
sexual assault, or combat (National Center for PTSD, 2016). According to Breslau, Reboussin, 
Anthony and Storr (2005), approximately 8% of people who experience a traumatic event go on 
to develop PTSD following exposure. According to the DSM-5, in order for someone to meet 
criteria for a PTSD diagnosis, they must experience exposure to a stressor (either directly or 
indirectly; Criterion A), they must demonstrate intrusive symptoms such as flashbacks to the 
trauma (Criterion B), demonstrate avoidance symptoms including avoiding trauma-related 
thoughts/feelings (Criterion C), experience negative alterations in cognitions and moods (e.g., 
negative affect; Criterion D), and must show alterations in arousal and reactivity (e.g., hyper 
vigilance; Criterion D; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Overall, in order to meet 
criteria for PTSD, one must also experience symptoms for more than one month (Criterion F) 
and the symptoms must cause significant functional impairment that is not due to the use of 
medication, illness and/or substance use (Criterion G, Criterion H; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). For the purposes of this thesis, we looked specifically at those who have 
been directly exposed to a trauma analogue and whether or not they demonstrated diagnostic 
criteria including intrusive symptoms and changes in affect. While PTSD and the classification 
of its symptoms is important, we still do not know enough about the mechanisms that contribute 
to PTSD’s development and continuation. Thus, the present research examines beliefs about, and 
the relationship between, how we encode memories for traumatic experiences and subsequent 
PTSD symptoms.       
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The Formation of Traumatic Memories and PTSD 
The critical symptoms of PTSD, those that contribute to the continuation of the disorder, 
include intrusions, avoidance, and hyper-reactivity (e.g., startled responses to loud noises). 
Intrusions are the sudden remembering or thinking about the traumatic experience (National 
Center for PTSD, 2016). Intrusions are a particularly crippling component of PTSD because, by 
definition, they occur without warning, are distressing, and can re-traumatize an individual 
following their initial traumatic experience (van der Kolk, van der Hart, & Burbridge, 1995). 
Avoidance, according to Monson and Shnaider (2014) is purposely avoiding thinking about the 
traumatic experience because of the stress it causes. Such avoidance of traumatic memories may 
lead to the development of poorly contextualized ideas about the trauma. Over time, that means 
that one develops an unclear memory about the details of their traumatic experience (i.e., such as 
exactly where they crashed their car, etc.,) and therefore may get confused about the details of 
that experience. This inability to contextualize one’s memory for their traumatic experience may 
cause the distortion of their traumatic memories. In fact, Rubin, Bernsten, and Bohni (2008) 
argue that PTSD is a memory disorder. Therefore, the present studies address the relationship 
between trauma, encoding, and memory distortion by determining whether or not we have 
existing beliefs about the way someone encodes a traumatic experience, as well as how that 
encoding effects their ability to remember that trauma and their degree of PTSD symptomology 
over time.  
The Cognitive Model         
In line with this idea, Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed the Cognitive Model of PTSD. It 
stipulates that how one processes or encodes a traumatic experience may affect their memory and 
PTSD symptoms. They proposed that PTSD occurs and persists, when people encode, or store, a 
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traumatic experience in a way that, when reminded of that trauma, makes them feel like they are 
in a state of ongoing threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This threat comes about in one of two ways. 
The first occurs when a person creates excessive, negative appraisals, or generates a lot of 
negative thoughts about their experience; the second occurs when an individual poorly 
contextualizes, or develops a poor understanding of their experience (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In 
other words, the Cognitive Model for PTSD suggests that the way we encode a traumatic 
experience directly relates to how severe that person’s PTSD symptomology becomes. In 
particular, the Cognitive Model posits that when people process specific details of an experience, 
or use data-driven encoding processes, they are more likely to poorly contextualize their 
traumatic experiences and thus are more likely to experience persistent PTSD symptoms.    
To elaborate, the two main types of encoding strategies are conceptually driven and data-
driven encoding. In conceptually driven encoding, an individual conceptualizes or makes 
meaning of what they encounter holistically (Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 2016). For example, 
if involved in a car accident, a person who processes this traumatic experience in a conceptually 
driven manner, would think about the fact that they are in a car accident, and what it might mean, 
rather than focus on any sensory details. By contrast, in data-driven encoding, the person would 
focus on, and thus remember specific, sensory details of the traumatic event, such as the sound of 
broken glass or the smell of blood (Oulton et al., 2016). The research on which encoding strategy 
has more detrimental effects on PTSD however, has produced inconsistent results.    
For example, Krans, Pearson, Maier, and Moulds (2016) tested Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
Cognitive Model by manipulating the contextual information given to participants when exposed 
to traumatic images. Contrary to Ehlers and Clark’s model, Krans and colleagues (2016) 
hypothesized that the conceptual processing that takes place during a traumatic experience would 
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actually increase PTSD symptoms, contrary to Ehlers and Clark’s proposal. Thus, in Part 1 of 
their study, “healthy” participants, defined as those without PTSD, viewed pictures depicting 
traumatic scenes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; the moderate 
outcome, severe outcome, and control group. Meaning that, those in the moderate outcome group 
were given a sentence with contextual information indicating that the situation shown was 
moderately traumatic (i.e., “There were many survivors”; Krans et al., 2016). Whereas, those in 
the severe condition were given contextual information indicating that the situation shown was 
severely traumatic (i.e., “There were few survivors”; Krans et al., 2016). All experimental 
participants received written narratives, which provided contextual information designed to assist 
in understanding and establishing meaning (i.e., the details about what was happening in the 
scene shown) about the negative scenes they were shown. By contrast, control participants saw 
photos with no context narrative given. In Part 2, participants took a memory test for what they 
were shown. All participants were also asked to self-report intrusion experiences in diaries. A 
week later, participants returned to complete an adapted version of the Impact of Events Scales 
(IES), a self-report measure that assesses a person’s distress surrounding a specific event on a 
Likert scale (i.e., “I had trouble concentrating”, 0=not at all, 4= Extremely; Horowitz, Wilner, & 
Alvarez, 1979). Krans and colleagues (2008) ultimately found that the severe traumatic scene 
group experienced significantly more intrusions in comparison to the moderate or no context 
conditions.  
By contrast, Barba, Mantovan, Traykov, Rieu, Laurent, Ermani, and Devouche (2002) 
sought to determine if an interfering task designed to disrupt participant’s encoding of traumatic 
scenes—and thus lead to data-driven processing—would elicit more intrusions and worse free 
recall performance for the stimuli. In their first experiment, Barba and colleagues found that 
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interference had no significant effect on participants’ ability to retrieve correct information 
during free recall or the number of intrusions experienced. In their second experiment however, 
they added an interference task at both encoding and retrieval. Now, there was a significant 
negative effect on participant’s memory and a significant increase in participant’s number of 
intrusions. Thus, Barba and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that data-driven processing could 
increase PTSD symptoms. 
Additionally, Segovia, Strange, and Takarangi (2016) examined whether different 
encoding instructions affect participants’ memory errors and PTSD symptoms. To allow for an 
objective measurement of memory disorganization using controlled methods, Segovia and 
colleagues (2016) had participants watch a traumatic film with missing scenes, and randomly 
assigned participants to one of three conditions. Participants in the conceptually driven encoding 
condition were told to focus on the meaning of the event. Participants in the data-driven 
encoding condition where told to focus on sensory details. Meanwhile, control group participants 
were not given instructions during the film. Participants recorded their intrusions for one week. 
Then, after a week delay participants returned to the lab to report their analogue PTSD 
symptoms, had their memory tested for the film, and rated their confidence rated based on what 
they reported remembering from the film. Segovia and colleagues’ (2016) results showed that the 
instructions did not matter. However, people who self-reported feeling more disorganization in 
their memory also reported more memory distortion and avoidance symptoms of PTSD. 
Meaning that, their objective measures did not support Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theory. Instead, 
they found that participant’s self-reported sense of memory was unorganized or lacked meaning, 
leading to increased symptoms of PTSD. 
To summarize, all of the above studies have tested Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) Cognitive 
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Model but have all presented inconsistent results on which encoding strategy actually worsens 
PTSD symptoms. With, at best, mixed empirical evidence to support that encoding contributes to 
increased PTSD symptoms, it is imperative that we continue to explore not only the effects of 
encoding on these symptoms, but how encoding may also effect the distortion of our traumatic 
memories in line with Rubin and colleagues (2008) more recent proposal.  
Memory Distortion and PTSD 
 Rubin and colleagues (2008) coined the relationship between memories for traumatic 
events and PTSD symptoms the “memory model of PTSD.” They proposed that the current 
memory one has for a traumatic event, not the event itself, drives symptomology. Most 
importantly, this model emphasizes that trauma memories are not consistent over time. Instead, 
trauma memories can be distorted by various factors like expectations, social support, and 
current emotions related to the memory for the event (Rubin et al., 2008). Indeed, memories are 
constructive by their nature. That makes them malleable, as well as subject to change and error. 
Certainly, people can come to remember additional details of events as well as totally false, 
detailed, memories for events that never actually occurred (Bartlett, 1932; 
Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry, & Loftus, 2012; Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Bernstein, 2005; 
Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). This fact of memory also extends to traumatic events 
(Crombag, Wagenaar, & Van Koppen, 1996; Granhag, Stromwall, & Billings, 2003; 
Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002; Pezdek, 2003). 
 In brief, trauma theorists had maintained that trauma memory was special; that a different 
kind of memory system was responsible. For example, Freud argued that traumatic memories are 
unconsciously buried by repression of the event, but could be recovered often decades later, with 
little memory error (Freud & Breuer, 1893–1895). Other researchers, such as Van der Kolk 
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(1994) argued that the “body kept the score.” That is, that trauma was stored in sensory-motor 
and emotional fragments (e.g., images of the trauma with no accompanying memory; Van der 
Kolk, 1994). However, since the 1990s, research has demonstrated that traumatic memories are 
not processed by a different memory system as originally proposed. 
Take for example, flashbulb memories. A flashbulb memory—say your memory of 
9/11—was thought of as a “photographic print” and the memory was assumed special in its 
ability to be fixed and permanent over time (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Peterson & Bell, 1996). 
Flashbulb memories got their name from the idea that when a highly emotional event takes place 
(i.e., community events like natural disasters, terror attacks, etc.,), a special type of memory is 
formed, as if the event was recorded, and preserved for all time (Brown & Kulik, 1977). In their 
original study, Brown and Kulik (1977) examined peoples’ memories of John F. Kennedy’s 
assassination nearly fourteen years after they experienced this highly publicized and emotional 
event. All participants were able to recall context-related information—where they were at the 
time, who they were with, what they were doing, etc., —when President Kennedy was killed. 
Many studies have replicated this basic finding regarding context-related recall: people claim 
vivid memories of 9/11, spaceship explosions, deaths of celebrities and world leaders, and 
natural disasters (e.g., Bahrick, Parker, Fivush, & Levitt, 1998; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; 
Peterson & Bell, 1996).  
 But Brown and Kulik’s (1977) study missed a crucial fact. Although people, specifically 
their participants, may have been able to report a large number of details about their highly 
emotional memories, those details are not necessarily accurate. In fact, Neisser and Harsch 
(1992) found that flashbulb memories were remembered inconsistently overtime, not as a perfect 
recording of the event. Likewise, other studies have shown that memories for emotional events 
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tend to be poorly remembered over time - not preserved in a special way (Clifford & Hollin, 
1981; Loftus & Burns, 1982). Instead of suggesting that emotions encourage the recording-like 
preservation of memories for those who have experience trauma, these studies have shown that 
emotions appear to have the opposite effect, often impairing the memory rather than perfecting it 
(Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Loftus & Burns, 1982).  
To be clear, intense emotions have been shown to affect the strength of traumatic memories 
(Levine & Edelstein, 2009). That is, central details are those that are conceptually associated 
with key details of an event (e.g., the fact that a car accident occurred). These details are 
typically better remembered for emotional events (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). By contrast, 
peripheral information, details not directly related to the key facts of an experience (e.g., the 
color of the shirt you were wearing during a car accident), are less likely to be remembered for 
emotional events (Reisberger & Heuer, 2004). Termed the memory narrowing effect, this effect 
has been replicated in several studies using different modes of presenting information such as 
films, narratives, and even simple words (Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Levine & Burgess, 1997; 
MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004; Safer, Christianson, Autry, 
& Osterlund, 1998). Importantly, this memory narrowing effect helps to explain why people 
think their trauma memories are special and unchanging because they believe that emotional, 
central details that they may remember to vividly are correct, even when they are not. 
Memory Amplification  
  Contrary to such notions that memories are special and preserved, the memory 
amplification effect describes how trauma memories can amplify (become more distorted) as 
PTSD symptoms fail to improve, or get worse, overtime. Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, and 
Charney (1997) were the first to demonstrate this memory amplification effect. They assessed 
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Gulf War Veteran’s exposure to war-related stressors (i.e., seeing comrades killed, being or 
seeing others wounded by combat, etc.) one month after returning from deployment, and again 
two years later. Participants completed the Desert Storm Questionnaire and the Mississippi Scale 
for Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder at one month and 2 years post-deployment. 
The Desert Storm Questionnaire was used to target the veterans’ particular Persian Gulf 
experiences via 19 self-report items where participant’s indicated if they had or had not 
experienced the items (i.e., extreme threat to one’s personal safety, living close enemy lines). 
Similarly, the Mississippi Scale for Combat-related PTSD used 35 self-report items to assess the 
veterans PTSD symptom severity and the effect those symptoms had on the veterans’ lives. 
Southwick and colleagues (1997) compared the participants’ one-month and 2 year responses to 
both questionnaires. Results revealed that 88% of veterans who originally said they had not been 
exposed to war-related stressors later changed their response to yes at their two year follow up. 
In other words, these veterans actually endorsed being exposed to more war-related stressors 
over time. Most importantly however, these findings also demonstrated a correlation between 
memory distortion and more PTSD symptoms exhibited overtime- demonstrating the memory 
amplification effect.  
Similar findings have been shown with peacekeepers (Bolton, Gray, & Litz, 
2006; Bramsen, Dirkzwager, van Esch, & van der Ploeg, 2001; Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, Ehlich, & 
Friedman, 1998), prisoners of war (Dekel, Solomon, & Ein-Dor, 2016) and various veteran 
populations (Alosco, Aslan, Du, Ko, Grande, Proctor, Concato, & Vasterling, 2016; Wilson, 
Hoge, McGurk, Thomas, & Castro, 2010; Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, Kutter, & Kaloupek, 
2003; Wessely, Unwin, Hotopf, Hull, Ismail, Nicolaou, & David, 2003). Memory amplification 
has also been demonstrated in shared natural disasters. For example, Heir, Piatigorsky, and 
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Weisaeth (2009) surveyed 532 individuals who endured the South-East Asia Tsunami of 2004. 
Participants were asked about how much danger they believed they were in at two points-six 
months and a year after the tsunami occurred (Heir et al., 2009). They found a positive 
correlation between perceived life threats over time with a lack of improvement of PTSD 
symptoms (Heir et al., 2009). Meaning that, their memories regarding the level of threat became 
distorted over time, in the same way that their PTSD symptoms failed to improve; again, 
demonstrating the memory amplification effect.  
However, most of the research on this topic has focused on field studies with participants 
pre-disposed to trauma (i.e., veterans who developed PTSD after exposure to combat during 
war), which has prevented the use of control measures (i.e., the context by which the traumatic 
experience occurred, the way the person developed meaning for the experience, etc.) and has 
yielded limited sample sizes (Anastasides, Beck, Pang, Servatius, Gilbertson, Orr, & Myers, 
2015; Dickie, Brunet, Akerib, & Armony, 2011; Scott, Woods, Wrocklage, Schweinsburg, 
Southwick, & Krystal, 2016). Moreover, there was a distinct lack of control of any of the key 
variables (i.e., the timing of the traumatic event, the length of time since the event). While these 
studies have inherently lacked internal validity, in terms of external validity, we know that 
participants experienced real time trauma, which has allowed for actual cases of memory 
amplification to be explored.  
To avoid some of the internal deficits of these studies however, Strange and Takarangi 
(2012) attempted to determine whether or not intrusions contribute to the memory amplification 
effect in a controlled laboratory setting. To do this, participants were shown a short film 
depicting a fatal car accident. The film was broken up into short clips, some were traumatic (i.e., 
watching the cars hit each other, the blood on the victims, emergency crews attempting to rescue 
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the passengers) some were not (i.e., clips of what the drivers were doing prior to the accident, the 
passengers talking to one another). Participants then returned twenty-four hours later and 
completed a memory test comprised of Old clips (clips they actually saw), control (New), and 
missing (footage that was purposely removed from the film they saw) clips. Participants were 
asked to identify whether or not the clips shown were Old (i.e., from the film) or New (i.e., clips 
they had never seen). Strange and Takarangi (2012) found that participants successfully 
recognized the control and Old clips. Critically, participants claimed that they saw twenty-six 
percent of the missing clips that they were never actually shown and many of these clips also 
happened to be the most traumatic (i.e., review of the deceased bodies at the accident scene). The 
rate at which participants also reported re-experiencing these traumatic clips (that is, experienced 
intrusions of the film) was correlated with the number of memory errors they made. Thus, 
Strange and Takarangi (2012) suggested that a failure in source-monitoring might explain their 
effect. 
The source-monitoring framework suggests that people do not properly store details of 
experiences in their memories with labels that specify where those experiences come from. As a 
result, they tend to rely on heuristics or memory shortcuts, such as how familiar the experience 
felt, (how much perceptual detail they have for that memory, etc.,) to determine whether or not 
the details of their memories are imagined, or if they actually occurred. Because people use these 
shortcuts, they can frequently mistake information they think they remember because these 
distorted memories feel familiar and come to mind with a lot of detail. Critically, intrusions 
typically meet these same criteria. Therefore, Strange and Takarangi (2012) suggested people 
might confuse their intrusive thoughts for something they actually experienced (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 2016).  
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To test this proposal, Strange and Takarangi (2014) again had all participants watch the 
traumatic film, this time they warned participants that some scenes had been removed, expecting 
this instruction would increase systematic source monitoring. Additionally, Strange and 
Takarangi put labels on some of the missing clips, describing what was missing, expecting that 
these labels would increase heuristic source monitoring. Their prediction was correct: false 
recognition rates were higher when participants saw labels and lower when they just got a 
warning. Thus, source monitoring ability can be manipulated and appears to be one mechanism 
explaining traumatic memory distortion. However, Strange and Takarangi did not measure 
memory amplification, per se. They only had one memory test. This is problematic because 
memory amplification speaks to the distortion of memory over time. With only one memory test, 
Strange and Takarangi (2014) could only measure immediate memory distortion, not the 
memory amplification effect.  
To address these limitations, Oulton and colleagues (2016) designed a laboratory experiment 
that more carefully matched the field studies. First, they randomly assigned participants to one of 
two conditions: the single test and the multiple test condition. Participants in the single test 
condition served as the control group and only took one memory test a week later. However, the 
multiple test group received a memory test twenty minutes following encoding and once again a 
week later to assess the memory amplification affect. All participants completed several PTSD 
symptom measures including the Traumatic History Screen (THS), the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-T), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), the Positive Affect Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS), the Experience of Intrusion Scale (EIS), and the PTSD Checklist 
(PLC-5). Next, participants viewed a set of buffer photos, followed by a set of target photographs 
from a computer screen. These buffer photos were used to control for primacy and recency 
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effects that may have subsequently influenced the memory-testing results. Participants then 
completed the PANAS measure for a second time. Participants in the single-test condition were 
provided paper diaries to record their intrusions for a week and sent away. Whereas, participants 
in the multiple test condition completed crossword puzzles for an additional 20 minutes, then 
completed an immediate recognition test, and the PTSD Checklist (PCL-5). Multiple-test 
participants too, were then given paper diaries to record their intrusions for a week. Following 
the week delay all participants were emailed a survey that included the PANAS, delayed 
recognition test, an EIS, and PCL test. Results of Study 1 indicated that analogue symptoms of 
PTSD were positively associated with remembering more negative images over time- again, 
demonstrating the memory amplification effect.   
Following these results, Oulton and colleagues (2016) conducted a second study to focus on 
the association between those whose memory amplified over time and their subsequent PTSD 
symptoms. The study followed the same approach as their Study 1, except all participants 
completed two tests and they did not complete the THS, BDI-II, STAI-T, or the intrusion dairy. 
Results of this Study 2, found that participants whose memory of the photos amplified over time 
also demonstrated more re-experiencing PTSD symptoms. Thus, Oulton and her colleagues 
(2016) also demonstrated evidence for the memory amplification effect. We follow Oulton and 
colleagues’ (2016) methodology here to test our own research questions.  
The Present Studies 
We had several goals in conducting this research. First, we were interested in establishing 
whether people have any existing beliefs about how one processes a traumatic event might 
contribute to their development of PTSD symptoms. If so, then it would lend some support to 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theory. Indeed, these beliefs may establish that there is a general 
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expectation people hold about how PTSD develops. Therefore, in Study 1, we surveyed people 
regarding their beliefs about how encoding strategies influence the development of PTSD. In 
Study 2, we conducted an experimental study, manipulating the type of encoding people could 
use during a traumatic event. Our goal for Study 2, was to determine if in fact, data-driven as 
opposed to conceptual processing, leads to an increase in memory distortion and PTSD 
symptoms.  
Study 1 
 In our first study, we were interested in establishing whether people have any existing 
beliefs about how encoding processes influence the development of PTSD. Thus we designed a 
simple survey comprised of a short paragraph defining the symptoms of PTSD followed by a 
brief newspaper article detailing a woman, Alex’s, traumatic car accident. We then asked 
participants a single question designed to probe their beliefs concerning the relationship between 
encoding and PTSD. We also asked them to rate how confident they were in their answer.  
Hypothesis            
 H1.Based on Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) Cognitive Model, we hypothesized that people 
would be more likely to indicate that paying attention to sensory details during a traumatic event 
contributes to the formation of traumatic memories and PTSD.  
Method 
Research Design 
 The study was a simple survey. There was no manipulated factor.  
Participants 
We recruited a total of 314 participants from the undergraduate research pool at John Jay 
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College of Criminal Justice. Participants were given extra credit for completing the survey. Of 
the 314, 261 participants fully completed the study. Participants in this study were not asked to 
identify their age, gender, or ethnicity.  
Materials and Procedure 
This survey was designed and administered using Qualtrics. Participants gave their 
consent to participate before beginning the survey and were informed that they could withdraw 
their consent to participate at any time. Participants were told that the study was about “facts and 
evidence from an investigation of a crime,” to avoid providing any biasing information. The John 
Jay Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this study. See Appendix A for Study 1’s 
informed consent and instructions.   
Introduction to PTSD. First, participants were asked to read a short paragraph that 
defined and listed some symptoms of PTSD (see Appendix B). Once participants finished 
reading this informational paragraph, they were asked to click the arrow to continue. 
Specifically, participants read the following: 
“Posttraumatic stress disorder is a mental health condition that typically follows 
exposure to some kind of trauma (i.e., a car accident). Symptoms of PTSD include, 
but are not limited to: 
• Unwanted thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event (Intrusions) 
• Nightmares 
• Persistent worry and fear (Anxiety) 
• Heightened sensitivity to what is going on around you with the fear that 
something might go wrong (Hyper-vigilance) 
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• Purposefully trying not to think about or remember the trauma (Avoidant 
thinking) 
•  Zoning out, creating a disconnect between your awareness and what is happening 
in real time (Dissociation)” 
 Newspaper Article. Participants were then instructed to read an article that they were 
told was printed in a local newspaper. It was titled, “Women Suffers Several Injuries Following 
Car Crash On Way to a Night Out with Friends.” This newspaper article (see Appendix C) was 
written by the author and does not reflect an actual event. This newspaper article explained how 
the main character, Alex, was texting and driving on her way to dinner with friends when she hit 
another car, causing her to suffer painful injuries including a sprained neck, broken arm, and 
heavy bleeding which required several stitches. The newspaper article provided the sensory 
details of this accident, as well as a statement from Alex, which detailed her thinking before and 
after the accident. After reading the newspaper article, participants were asked to click on an 
arrow to continue with the survey.  
Encoding Style Question. Immediately following the newspaper article, participants 
were told (see also Appendix D): 
“Alex developed PTSD as a result of this accident. Which of the following 
explanations do you think is most likely WHY she developed PTSD: 
1. Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the sound of the other 
car’s horn honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the pain of the 
glass cutting into her skin, etc.,). 
2. Alex focused on how the accident happened and why it happened to her (i.e., she 
was rushing, she went through the windshield because she did not have her seatbelt on, 
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she dropped her phone and took her eyes off the road and that’s why she did not see 
someone hit her, etc.,).  
3. It does not matter what Alex focused on during the accident.” 
Confidence Rating and Explanation. Participants were then asked to rate their 
confidence in their selection using a Likert Scale (0 = Not at all Confident, 100 = Completely 
Confident). Participants were given an additional open-ended space to type explanations for their 
confidence ratings (see Appendix E).  
Debriefing. After completing all prior components of the survey, participants were 
thanked for their participation and debriefed. Participants were informed of the true purpose of 
the survey, which was to examine whether or not people believe that how someone encodes a 
traumatic event, effects their PTSD symptomology (See Appendix F).  
Results and Discussion 
Recall that we hypothesized participants would be more likely to indicate that paying 
attention to sensory details during a traumatic event contributes to the formation of traumatic 
memories and PTSD. Our hypothesis was supported. Participants were more likely to endorse 
option 1 of the encoding question, “Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the 
sound of the other car’s horn honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the 
pain of the glass cutting into her skin, etc.,).” Indeed, a chi square analysis revealed that 
participants were significantly more likely to believe that focusing on sensory factors led to 
PTSD: X2 (N =261) = 26.94, p < .01. See Table 1 below for the means and standard deviations 
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Table 1 
Mean Confidence Ratings and Standard Deviations Based on Selection Chosen 






1- Alex focused on the sensory details of 
the accident… 
130 68.48 1.71 
2- Alex focused on how the accident 
happened and why it happened to her… 
74 67.69 2.26 
3- It does not matter… 57 58.09 2.58 
 
We also anticipated that participant’s who selected option 1 would be significantly more 
confident than those who selected option 2 and 3. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was a 
significant difference in the confidence ratings of participants who selected the three different 
options, F (2, 260) = 6.06, p < .01. However, follow up t-tests reveal that it was option 3 
participants, “It does not matter…” who were significantly less confident in their selection 
(Option 1 & 3: t (185) = 32.48, p < .01; Option 2 & 3: t (129) = 22.65, p < .01). This may mean 
then, that people actually believe that encoding styles matter, but did not know which option was 
“right.” And thus, when they chose option 3 they were less confident.  
In summary, it appears that people’s beliefs regarding the development of PTSD may 
align with that of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) proposal. As previously discussed, the Cognitive 
Model is a psychological framework, suggesting that PTSD persists when people encode, or 
store, a traumatic experience into their memory in a way that, when reminded of that trauma, 
makes them feel like they are in a state of ongoing threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Here, 
participants endorsed the idea that by focusing on the sensory details Alex was exposed to during 
her car accident, she was more likely to develop PTSD. More specifically, participants more 
often endorsed that her data-driven encoding strategy caused the character, Alex, to poorly 
contextualize her traumatic experiences, causing her persistent PTSD symptoms. In Study 2, we 
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tested whether those beliefs match the empirical evidence as these lay beliefs may also affect 
people’s expectancies for responses to trauma.	  
Study	  2	  
	  
Our second study, Study 2, examined whether people’s encoding strategy when they 
experience a traumatic event, affects their later emotions and their ability to remember that 
trauma over time. We hypothesized that participants in our data-driven encoding condition 
would misremember more trauma over time, indicating “New photos in Phase 2 as “Old.” In 
addition, despite the mixed evidence we discussed in the Introduction, in line with Ehlers and 
Clark (2000) proposal and our Study 1 results, we hypothesized that participants in our data-
driven encoding condition would experience more analogue PTSD symptoms over time. 
Notably, if both occurred, we would have evidence that the memory amplification effect is more 
likely after data-driven processing. 
Hypotheses            
 H1. We first hypothesized that data-driven participants would be less likely to remember 
the photos in immediate testing because if they are just focusing on the sensory details, they are 
likely not encoding the images as well as they would without an instruction or with a conceptual 
instruction. 
H2. In addition, we hypothesized that those in the data-driven encoding condition would 
misremember more trauma over time. 
H3. Lastly, we hypothesized that data-driven participants would demonstrate more PTSD 
symptoms. 
Methods 
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Note that this thesis was part of a much larger project. Thus, a number of measures were 
collected that were beyond the scope of this thesis. I describe below all of the measures, and note 
what was not analyzed in this thesis. 
Research Design 
The study conformed to a 3 (Encoding Manipulation: conceptually driven, data-driven, 
and control) x 2 (Test 1, Test 2), mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three encoding conditions—control, conceptual, or data-driven. Those in the data-driven 
encoding condition (N = 63) were given specific instructions to pay attention to the sensory 
details of each photograph they were shown at encoding, such as the sound of breaking glass. 
Those in the conceptually driven encoding condition (N = 63) were also given instructions to 
make meaning of each photograph they were shown at encoding. For example, if the image 
depicted a deadly car accident, participants were instructed to acknowledge that they were 
looking at a fatal car accident. Those in the control condition (N = 64) were not given any 
encoding instructions.  
Participants  
We recruited a total of 389 participants. Of the 389, 143 participants dropped out of the 
study, meaning that they did not complete Phase 2. We also removed participants who, due to a 
survey-flow error received additional questions at encoding (N = 52), or reported experiencing 
technical difficulties (N = 4). Out of the 190 participants who completed the study, 120 identified 
as female and 70 participants identified as male. Our participants ranged in age from 17-65 years 
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Trauma Stimulus. Following Oulton and colleagues’ (2016) design, the trauma stimulus 
was 80 standardized International Affect Picture System (IAPS) photographs, which depict 
traumatic, negative scenes such as severe burns, death, and car accidents (Lang et al., 1993). The 
photographs were counterbalanced into four sets of 20 photos. An additional 10 negative photos 
were shown at the beginning and at the end of the encoding phase. These photos were used for 
all participants, never tested more than once and acted as recency and primacy buffers for the 
traumatic photos (see Appendix G).  
Photo Ratings. To assess mood following encoding, participants were asked to rate how 
distressing, disgusting, and unpleasant they found each photo (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). To 
assess our participant’s focus and level of attention during testing, we also asked our participants 
to rate how closely they paid attention to each photo (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely closely). 
Doing so told use several things about how participants reacted to our encoding phase. First, this 
attention rating showed us whether or not participants in one encoding condition paid more 
attention than another, as perhaps this could have influenced our results. Secondly, assessing 
participant’s attention to our trauma analogue tells us something about participants’ engagement 
in the overall encoding process. 
Trauma History Screen (THS). Participants completed the Trauma History Screen 
(THS) to measure their past traumatic experiences and to establish their baseline moods. Carlson, 
Smith, Palmieri, Dalenberg, Ruzek, Kimerling, Burling, & Spain (2011) developed the THS to 
examine the frequency of traumatic events and these events’ association with a person’s 
exposure to high magnitude stressor events (HMS) as well as their persisting post-traumatic 
distress symptoms (PPD). For example, participants were asked, “Have you ever been in a car 
accident,” to which they could have responded “yes or no.” The THS is a self-report measure 
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with high construct validity, as supported by correlations found between the PTSD Checklist 
(PCL-C) scores (which measures PTSD symptoms) and HMS scores found in both veteran (0.41) 
and college participants (0.22; Carlson et al., 2011). I do not analyze these data here.    
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). Participants completed the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to measure their baseline depression symptoms. 
To complete the BDI-II, participants rated each of the 21 items on a Likert scale (e.g., 0 = I do 
not feel like a failure, 3 = I feel I am a complete failure as a person). The BDI-II correlates well 
with the depression subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R) (r = 0.89; Steer, 
Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1997). BDI–II also has high internal consistency, particularly amongst 
college students, which is noteworthy given that most of our sample comprised of students (α = 
0.93; Beck et al., 1996). I do not analyze these data here. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T). In addition, participants 
completed the trait subscale from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T) 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The STAI-T is another self-report measure where 
participants rated 20 items (e.g., “I lack self-confidence”) on a Likert scale (1 = almost never, 4 = 
almost always; see Appendix H). The STAI-T yields high test-retest reliability (r = 0.88) and has 
high internal consistency (α = 0.89) and (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). We used the STAI-T to 
establish participant’s baseline feelings of anxiety. I do not analyze these data here.
 Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Participants completed both the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule subscales (positive and negative) (PANAS) prior to 
and following encoding to measure their pre and post positive (PA) and negative affects (NA; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Both the positive and negative subscales are measured on a 
Likert scale with items like “Distressed” and “Attentive” (i.e., 1 = very slightly or not at all, to 
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5= extremely). The PA subscale is negatively correlated with the BDI (r = −0.34) and the NA 
subscale is highly correlated with the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) (r = 0.74). The test-
retest reliability for PANAS is also high (0.81 (NA) and 0.79 (PA) and yields excellent 
convergent and divergent correlations (Watson et al., 1988).     
Intrusion Monitoring and Vigilance Task. Following baseline mood measures and the 
encoding phase, participants simultaneously completed an intrusion monitoring and vigilance 
task. To monitor intrusions after the encoding phase, participants pressed a key when they 
experienced an intrusive memory. We defined intrusions for the participants as the sudden 
remembering or re-experiencing of negative feelings about the traumatic photographs (Oulton et 
al., 2016). For each intrusion participant’s experienced, they wrote down a description of that 
intrusion’s content. These descriptions included details, such as whether the intrusion was a 
thought and/or an image, the level of distress the intrusion caused the participant (1 = not at all, 5 
= extremely), the vividness of the intrusion (1 = not at all vivid, 5 = extremely vivid), and how 
hard the participant tried to forget about the intrusion as it occurred (1 = not at all, 5 = 
completely). The intrusion task was used to provide a more controlled means of recording 
intrusions as opposed to having participants complete individual diary entries. During this 
intrusion monitoring process, participants also worked on a tedious vigilance task, which 
involved identifying vertical lines amongst horizontal lines on the computer. To assess 
participant’s engagement in the intrusion task, we also asked them to rate how well they 
conformed to the monitoring phase instructions (1 = not at all well, 7 = extremely well).  We 
chose this specific computer task as it has been shown to reliably prompt task-unrelated 
thoughts, allowing for intrusions to occur (Oulton et al., 2016; Giambra, 1989). I do not analyze 
these data here. 
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Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS). We also used the Experiences of Intrusions Scale 
(EIS; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park & Litz, 2009). The EIS uses five self-reports items to 
assess the quality of participant’s intrusions. Participants rated the occurrence, unwantedness and 
randomness of their subsequent intrusions. Participants also rated the level of distress and 
interference they experienced because of their intrusions (1 = not at all/almost never, 5 = 
extremely/very frequently). The EIS correlates well with other intrusion measures such as the re-
experiencing subscale of the PCL-C (PTSD Checklist for Civilians; Weathers et al., 1993; r = 
0.22) and yields both good test-retest reliability (r = 0.83) and internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
α’s > 0.83). I do not analyze these data here. 
Recognition Memory Test. Following Oulton and colleagues (2016), our immediate and 
delayed memory tests included one set of previously encoded photos (“Old” photos) and two sets 
of photos that had not been shown, considered “New” photos. Of the New photos, one set of 
pictures was the target, traumatic photos. For the Phase 1 immediate memory test, participants 
identified “Old” (pictures they had seen before) or “New” (pictures they had not seen) and 
indicated how confident they are in their “Old” and “New” ratings (1 = not at all confident, 10 = 
extremely confident). A week later in Phase 2, participants completed the delayed recognition 
memory test, which contained different photos compared to the immediate test but followed the 
same methodological design (see Appendix I).  
PTSD Checklist (PCL). Lastly, participants completed the PTSD Checklist (PCL; 
Weathers, et al., 1993). The PCL is a 17 item self-report measure we used to assess participants’ 
trauma symptoms in both phases. For example, following Phase 1 encoding, participants were 
asked “feeling jumpy or easily startled,” to which they would respond, 1 = not at all up to 5 = 
extremely. Test-retest reliability for the PCL is high (r = 0.96; Weathers et al., 1993). The PCL 
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correlates well with other PTSD measures (like the Impact of Event Scale- a PTSD symptom 
measure commonly used following traumatic experiences; re-experiencing: r = 0.76, hyper 
arousal: r = 0.64, avoidance: r = 0.71; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; Ruggiero, Del Ben, 
Scotti, & Rabalais, 2003; Vreven, Gudanowski, King, & King, 1995). The PCL also has high 
internal consistency (re-experiencing: α = 0.94, hyper-arousal: α = 0.92, avoidance: α  = 0.91; 
Keen, Kutter, Niles & Krinsley, 2008).  
Procedure                    
Our procedure followed that of Oulton and colleagues (2016), the only difference was the 
instructions participants were given about what to do with each photo during the encoding phase.  
Phase 1 All participants began by reading and signing our consent form (see Appendix 
J). Prior to receiving encoding training and instructions on how to use their assigned encoding 
strategy, all participants completed measures to establish their baseline moods. These measures 
included the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS), the Trauma History Screen (THS), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait scale 
(STAI-T) as described above. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
encoding conditions—control, conceptual, or data-driven. Those in the data-driven encoding 
condition were given specific instructions to pay attention to the sensory details of each 
photograph they were shown, such as the sound of breaking glass. Those in the conceptually 
driven encoding condition were also given instructions to make meaning of the traumatic 
photographs. For example, if the image depicted a deadly car accident, participants should have 
acknowledged that they were looking at a fatal car accident. Finally, those in the control 
condition were not given any encoding instructions. After completing their training examples, 
participants moved onto the encoding phase. Here, participants viewed a series of traumatic 
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(IAPS) photos as well as the buffer photographs at the beginning and end of the photo set. 
Participants saw each photograph for 2.5 seconds and a blank screen appeared after each 
photograph for 1.5 seconds. Following the encoding phase, participants completed the PANAS 
measure for a second time, and were instructed to press “x” on a keyboard when they 
experienced an intrusion (intrusion monitoring task), or unwanted thought/feeling about the 
traumatic photos). Finally, participants completed an immediate memory test for the photographs 
they were shown. This test asked participants to identify if the pictures they were shown were 
“New” as in they have not seen them before or if the picture is “Old” as in they have seen this 
picture before in a random order. Participants also indicated how confident they were in their 
“Old” and “New” ratings (1 = not at all confident, 10 = extremely confident). They also 
completed the PCL. 
Phase 2 A week later, participants were emailed Phase 2 of the study. In Phase 2, 
participants were given an additional, different, memory test. This second memory test worked 
the same way as the immediate memory test. Participants indicated whether the traumatic photos 
they were shown were “Old”, as in they have seen the photograph before, or “New” as in they 
have not seen the photograph before. This step determined whether participants misremembered 
the traumatic photographs over the course of the week. In Phase 2, participants also completed 
the EIS to measure their intrusion experiences, the PCL, and the PANAS measure again to see if 
their PTSD symptomology had increased over the week. To conclude, all participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation (see Appendix K).       
Results 
We began our data analyses by examining whether participants were affected by the 
photos: the PANAS ratings before and after the encoding phase as well as examining how much 
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attention they paid to the photos, how disgusting, unpleasant, and distressing they found them. 
We then examined participants’ memory test performance at Time 1. Finally, we examined 
participants’ sensitivity and response bias to the photos, our measure of memory amplification, 
and their analogue symptoms according to the PCL.  
Responses to the Photos 
To determine whether the photographs affected participants emotionally, we compared 
their PANAS subscale scores before and after viewing the IAPS photos. We conducted two 2 
(time 1 versus time 2 PANAS ratings) x 3 (condition: conceptually driven encoding, data-driven 
encoding, and control) repeated measures ANOVAs one on the positive affect subscale and one 
on the negative affect subscale. There were no significant differences between the conditions on 
either subscale, all p > .34. 
 In terms of attention during encoding of the photos, all conditions were comparable for 
attention to the memory test F(2, 187) = 1.21, p = .30 (see Table 2). In addition, the proportion of 
participants who indicated that they looked away during photo encoding and testing was 
comparable across all conditions, p = .50 for encoding and p = .82 for testing. The proportion of 
participants who left the study during the encoding phase was also comparable across all 
conditions, p = .51. 
 Finally, as Tables 2 and 3 reveal, there was no effect on condition in participants rating of 
the photos as disgusting, distressing, and unpleasant. This is significant because we know that 
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Table 2 
Time 1 Mean Photo Ratings (SE in parentheses) 
Condition  Time 1  Time 1  Time 1   Time 1 
















































F  0.23 .19  1.00  1.88 




Time 2 Mean Photo Ratings (SE in parentheses) 
Condition  Time 2  Time 2   Time 2   Time 2   Time 2 
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F  0.42  .54  .72  .48  .19 
P  < .66  < .58  < .49  < .62  < .82 
 
 
Immediate Memory Accuracy          
 Recall that our first hypothesis was that data-driven participants would be less likely to 
remember the photos in immediate testing. Therefore, we first analyzed participants’ memory 
accuracy immediately after encoding. To do this, we followed Oulton and colleagues (2016) 
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methods by calculating the mean proportion of “Old” responses to both Old and New photos. A 
3 (condition: conceptually driven, data-driven, and control) x 3 (photo type: old, new, neutral), 
mixed model ANOVA confirmed that there was a significant effect of condition on responses to 
neutral photos only, F(2, 187) = 6.53, p = .002. Post-hoc Games Howell analyses showed that 
those in the data-driven condition responded “Old” during memory testing significantly more 
often to neutral photos (e.g., a basket) as compared to the conceptual condition (p = .003). See 
Table 4 for the memory accuracy means and standard deviations. Therefore, while there is some 
evidence that data-driven encoding affected accuracy, it did not affect our primary measure of 
interest: Old responses to New photos. 
Table 4 
Mean proportion of ‘OLD’ responses (with 95% confidence intervals) for old, new and neutral 
photos in each condition. 
Memory Amplification 
Next we turned to our main interest: whether participant’s memory of the trauma stimuli 
amplified between Phase 1 and Phase 2 and whether that differed by condition. Specifically, we 
wanted to know whether participants would respond “Old” to more negative photos that were 
actually New photos, during the Phase 2 delayed memory test as compared to the Phase 1 
immediate memory test. To distinguish between participants’ ability to accurately remember 
previously seen traumatic photos (i.e., their sensitivity to these photos) from their response bias 
 Condition    
Photo 
Type 
Data-Driven Conceptual  Control Statistic 
Neutral  .10 [.05, .15] .01 [.01, .02] .05 [.02, .08] F(2, 187) = 6.53, p = 
.002 
Old  .79 [.74, .84] .84 [.81, .87] .84 [.80, .87] F(2, 187) = 1.07, p = 
.35 
New  .29 [.22, .36] .22 [.17, .28] .27 [.21, .33] F(2, 187) = 1.63, p = 
.20 
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(i.e., whether they have seen a photo), we used a signal detection approach (Stainslaw & 
Todorov, 1999). The data appear in Table 5. 
Indeed, one-way ANOVAs for both sensitivity F(2, 187) = 1.48, p = .23) and response 
bias (F(2, 187) = .25, p = .78), revealed that our encoding condition manipulation did not have a 
significant effect. In other words, encoding condition did not produce differences in participant’s 
likelihood of endorsing more traumatic images (response bias) at Phase 2 testing. Likewise, these 
findings show that participant’s sensitivity, or their ability to distinguish if they had actually seen 
the photograph before, was not effected by encoding condition. Overall, these findings suggest 
that perhaps people’s processing style at encoding is not the primary mechanism behind 
traumatic memory distortion.  
Table 5  
Participant’s Response Bias and Sensitivity Means and Standard Deviations 
 Condition Mean Std. Error 
Response Bias Data-driven 1.70 .15 
 Conceptual 2.04 .12 
 Control 1.90 .15 
 Total 1.88 .08 
Sensitivity Data-driven -0.14 .07 
 Conceptual -.10 .06 
 Control -.16 .06 
 Total -.13 .04 
   
Analogue PTSD Symptoms      
To see whether or not participant’s symptoms changed over time, we compared their 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 PCL scores. We ran a 2 (PCL scores in Phase 1 and Phase 2) x 3 
(conceptually driven, data-driven, and control) ANOVA. Results indicate that there was no 
difference between PCL scores amongst the three conditions p < .44). Moreover, there was no 
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significant association with change in sensitivity or memory errors over time, p > .05. Therefore, 
contrary to our expectations, we did not observe a memory amplification effect here. 
General Discussion 
The overall goal of our research was to assess if how one encodes a traumatic experience, 
affects the memory amplification effect. To do this we first determined if people do, in fact, have 
an expectation that focusing on sensory details during a traumatic event is critical to the 
development of PTSD, because perhaps these change their expectations for trauma outcomes. 
Our Study 1 hypothesis was supported in that participants endorsed the idea that focusing on 
sensory details increases the likelihood that a person will develop PTSD. Thus, in Study 2, we 
manipulated encoding instructions to see if different encoding styles contribute to the memory 
amplification effect.  
To do so, in Study 2 we manipulated participants’ encoding strategy for our trauma 
analogue. Our results however, did not confirm a relationship between encoding style and the 
memory amplification effect, as we originally anticipated. Our response bias and sensitivity 
analyses reveal that encoding style had no effect. Likewise, our results did not confirm our Study 
2 hypothesis that data-driven participants would be less likely to remember all photos in 
immediate testing. Instead, we found that data-driven participants were less likely to remember 
target photographs and more likely to endorse remembering neutral photographs than those in 
the conceptual and control conditions. Finally, we found no difference in participant’s PTSD 
symptoms across conditions. This finding is inconsistent with previous studies, which have 
suggested that encoding strategies play a critical role in PTSD symptom changes (e.g., Giosan, 
Malta, Jayasinghe, Spielman, & Difede, 2009; Roemer et al., 1998).  
 One explanation for why we did not find the memory amplification effect by 
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manipulating encoding could be that the memory consolidation phase, the time between when 
one experiences an event and creates a memory for that event, contributes more to the memory 
amplification effect than encoding. Put simply, we may be looking at the wrong phase of 
memory. The memory consolidation phase may play a larger role in traumatic memory 
amplification compared to encoding, as it has been shown to be a critical point at which 
traumatic memories are most vulnerable and malleable (McGaugh, 1996; McGaugh, 2000). A 
recent study conducted by Iyadurai, Blackwell, Meiser-Stedman, Watson, Bonsall, Geddes, 
Nobre, and Holmes (2017) found that cognitive tasks with high visuospatial demands (they used 
the game Tetris), selectively disrupted sensory aspects in memory and limited the occurrence of 
intrusions, reducing memory distortions of trauma (Iyadurai et al., 2018). In fact, this task 
(playing Tetris) reduced intrusive memories for trauma by 62%- a significant reduction in PTSD 
symptoms that could not be drawn from manipulating encoding conditions as we did in the 
present study (Iyadurai et al., 2018). By disrupting the memory consolidation phase, Iyadurai and 
colleagues (2018) were able to prevent not only a significant amount of memory distortion, but 
also reduced critical PTSD symptoms that have been shown to continue to amplify traumatic 
memories over time (Iyadurai et al., 2018). Thus, future studies should investigate the effect of 
manipulations to the memory consolidation stage in traumatic memory amplification. 
Additionally, it may be the case that negative responses to our trauma analogue, 
specifically intrusions, caused our participants to generate false memories about the trauma after 
their initial encoding exposure. In other words, it may be the case that some people are more 
prone to ruminate, or continuously think about their traumatic experiences--which leads to an 
increase in intrusions and encourages the memory amplification effect, not the way by which the 
experience is originally encoded (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This idea makes sense considering 
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that Oulton and colleagues’ study (2016), demonstrated the memory amplification effect without 
manipulating encoding. This is critical because their findings point to the possibility of a 
mechanism contributing to memory amplification after exposure, not during the encoding phase 
as originally hypothesized. Oulton and colleagues (2016) also demonstrated that the relationship 
between memory amplification and intrusions was clear; the more re-experiencing symptoms 
participants reported, the more likely they were to experience the memory amplification effect 
despite finding a non-significant relationship between Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS) 
scores and participant’s memory amplification (Oulton et al., 2016). Altogether, perhaps 
intrusions are contributing to the memory amplification more than anticipated because they are 
altering the original memory of the traumatic experience. Future research should further explore 
this relationship to see if people’s tendency to ruminate about their traumatic experiences plays a 
larger role in predicting memory amplification over time. Future studies should also continue to 
explore why some are more prone to ruminate than others; perhaps the way one ruminates or the 
extent to which (i.e., the frequency) one experiences intrusions, can reveal more about who is 
more susceptible to memory amplification than encoding has in the present studies.  
Alternatively, it is possible that participant’s PTSD symptoms resulted in systematic 
information-processing biases--biases that contributed to participants overestimating the amount 
of traumatic images they were actually shown, not the way they encoded that information to 
begin with (Oulton et al., 2016). The use of information-processing biases has also been shown 
in cases studying those with anxiety and depression (co-occurring symptoms of PTSD; Mathews, 
1990). Future studies should thus, explore the role these biases may play following the encoding 
of traumatic images. Perhaps even, the way by which one encodes a traumatic event, contributes 
to their use of this bias, and that is why we see the memory amplification effect occurring over 
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time, not soon after encoding.  
Lastly, memory amplification may be the result of heuristic use, such as the availability 
heuristic, a bias where people rely on information they think they know but actually refer to that 
material because it can easily be retrieved from their memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). If 
people rely on the availability heuristic to remember their traumatic experiences, it may be the 
case these individuals experience more PTSD symptoms overtime because they easily recalled 
the negative, traumatic memories they are frequently reminded of via re-experiencing symptoms 
like intrusions (Oulton et al., 2016). Future studies should examine correlations between the 
availability heuristic and rumination, because this relationship may explain memory distortion 
and changes in PTSD symptoms that occur overtime. Overall, our findings do not demonstrate 
that encoding contributes to the memory amplification effect nor do they show support for Ehlers 
and Clark’s Cognitive Model (2000). However, our findings do have some limitations to be 
addressed in future research and provide several implications for the exploration of the memory 
amplification effect. 
Limitations 
First, it is important to acknowledge the inherent limitations in assessing trauma in a 
laboratory design. Because we could not expose participants to an actual, real-time traumatic 
experience like a deadly car accident, and could only show participants photos of traumatic 
experiences, our paradigm is clearly artificial. We also acknowledge that viewing graphic images 
does not exactly replicate emotions or physical responses associated with experiencing real 
trauma (i.e., intense fear, fight, flight, or freeze responses). Nonetheless, our participants 
experienced some degree of negative emotion. Our participants, regardless of encoding 
condition, responded negatively to and experienced negative emotional reactions following 
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exposure to our trauma analogue. It is important to acknowledge that we did not analyze whether 
or not our participants would have met criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. We also only assessed 
certain criteria including changes in affect, which inherently limits our generalizability, as our 
data does not address all PTSD diagnostic requirements.  
 
Additionally, our sample may not be representative of the entire population. We had to 
exclude some participants due to failure to pass our instructional manipulation checks, for not 
completing the study, and for experiencing technical difficulties that could have confounded 
their responses (i.e., inability to view the traumatic photos). Our sample is also mainly comprised 
of female college students who could be biased by their age and gender. Research indicates that 
there are indeed sex differences in physiological reactions to emotional stimuli, like trauma, 
between males and females (Lang et al., 1993). We did not analyze whether or not our female 
participants’ memory accuracy of the traumatic photos was different than that of our male 
participants. Thus, we cannot rule out gender differences for memory amplification based on the 
present study.  
In regards to our paradigm, many of our measures relied on self-reporting. This is not 
uncommon for this line of research as many of the measures for PTSD (i.e., PCL-5, EIS, THS) 
are made up of self-report questionnaires. However, because self-reports rely on participant’s 
own volition when responding, it is possible that their responses were untruthful or inaccurate 
(i.e., shame in reporting feelings experienced, or the number of intrusions experienced). We 
aimed to control for any individual differences via the random assignment of our participants to 
each of the three encoding conditions, but we did not assess for an array of possibilities. Lastly, 
because our study was administered online, we do not know if participant’s individual 
environment influenced their responses (i.e., being distracted during the encoding phase).  
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Implications 
Our Study 1 results demonstrate that people do have lay beliefs about the role of 
encoding on PTSD symptomology. This is important for future studies as this finding suggests 
that these beliefs may alter the expectations for trauma. However, despite not being able to 
confirm our Study 2 hypotheses, our findings also yield significant implications. As discussed, 
this study is one of few to assess trauma in a controlled, empirical setting. Many studies on this 
subject have focused on those pre-disposed to trauma, yielded limited sample sizes, and lacked 
control measures (Anastasides et al., 2015; Dickie et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2016; Southwick et 
al., 1997). By assessing encoding in a controlled lab environment, we addressed many of these 
limitations and were able to control several factors of exposure to trauma that significantly varied 
in field studies such as the length of trauma exposure, the type of trauma, and post trauma 
exposure assessments.  
Further, because our findings suggest that encoding may not be the key to understanding 
the memory amplification effect, we have worked to narrow down possible alternatives. Doing 
so offers inspiration for several future research projects. First, future research should investigate 
the role of rumination in memory amplification. We know from research such as that of Oulton 
and colleagues (2016) that rumination regarding a traumatic experience may increase intrusions 
and memory distortion. Second, future research should look to assess the frequency of heuristic 
use such as that of the availability heuristic, in traumatic memory amplification.  Perhaps the use 
of heuristics is creating a bias in tandem with rumination where people are endorsing and more 
easily retrieving their distorted memories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 Overall, the way by which we encode a traumatic event does not appear to influence the 
negative emotions, memory distortion, and PTSD symptoms that plague those exposed to 
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trauma. Thus, it is critical that the field continue to explore traumatic memory amplification. 
Once we identify the driving force behind this phenomenon, we can potentially develop 
preventive measures and more appropriate levels of clinical care for those affected. Hopefully 
one day, we can prevent the memory distortion and increase in PTSD symptoms that make up 
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Appendix A 
                           Study 1 Informed Consent and Participant Instructions 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
 John Jay College Department of Psychology      
Title of Research Study:  Perspectives on Trauma  
 Principal Investigator: Kelsey Barnett, John Jay College 
                                        Deryn M. Strange, PhD, Associate Professor John Jay College 
  You are invited to participate in a research study under the direction of Kelsey Barnett, a Ba/Ma 
student at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and Dr. Deryn Strange, an Associate Professor at 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, USA. Thank you for your interest in participating. 
 You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are over the age of 18. 
There will be approximately 300 total participants. In this study, you will see facts and evidence 
from an investigation of a crime. At the end of the study, you will answer some questions about 
what you have read. The study should take no more than 45 minutes total and you will be 
granted course credit upon completion. 
 Your participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of a 
computer and the Internet, and confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the 
technology used. Only your responses to each task will be recorded. In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your coded, anonymous data may be 
shared with other competent researchers or used in other related studies. Your participation in 
this research is voluntary and you can stop participating at any time. Although there are no direct 
benefits to you, your participation will help to expand the scientific literature. 
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 If you have any questions comments, or concerns, you can contact Kelsey Barnett 
(email: Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu) or Dr. Deryn Strange (email: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu). If 
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or if you would like to talk to 
someone other than the researchers, you can contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator 
at 646-664-8918. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
 I have read and understood the information about this research project. I understand the purpose 
of this research, what will happen if I participate, and what will happen to the information I 
provide. I understand the measures in place to protect my privacy and confidentiality, such that 
the information I provide will be coded by a number that does not identify me. I understand that I 
can withdraw my consent at any time prior to the end of my scheduled participation, and I do not 
have to give a reason.     
 By clicking the arrow below you are consenting to participate in the study 
Instructions: 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. We are interested in how 
newspaper articles about car accidents influence people’s understanding of Post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD).  
This study will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You will be asked to 
read a short paragraph about post traumatic Stress Disorder. You will then be asked to 
read a newspaper article about a recent, severe car accident. Lastly, you will answer 
follow up questions regarding the article. Once you complete the entire survey, you will 
receive credit. 
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If at anytime, you do not wish to continue participating, you may exit the survey. 
You will not be penalized for failure to complete this study. If you have any questions 
please contact the researcher, Kelsey Barnett, at Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu.  
When you are ready to begin, please click next.  
Appendix B 
Study 1 PTSD Introduction Paragraph 
Please read the following paragraph about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Posttraumatic stress disorder is a mental health condition that typically follows 
exposure to some kind of trauma (i.e., a car accident). Symptoms of PTSD include, but 
are not limited, to intrusions (unwanted thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event), 
nightmares, anxiety, hyper vigilance, avoidant thinking, dissociation, etc,. 
Click next to continue. 
  Appendix C 
          Study 1 Newspaper Article 
Please read this excerpt from a local newspaper article about a severe car accident: 
 
Women Suffers Several Injuries Following Car Crash On Way to a Night Out with Friends
It was 5:00pm on Tuesday, October 5th 
when Alex was leaving her job and headed 
to meet up with her friends for dinner. The 
restaurant was 20 minutes outside of Alex’s 
small suburban town, and she was worried 
about being late. We spoke with Alex, who 
told us she rushed into her car, and 
forgetting to put her seatbelt on, sped off 
onto the highway. Alex told reporters she 
usually never uses her cell phone while 
driving but after each of one her friends 
called her to see if she was close to the 
restaurant, she decided to call one of them 
back to tell them she’d be at least 15  
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minutes late. Doing 75 mph in a 55mph 
speeding zone, Alex picked up her phone to 
A photo of Alex’s car following the accident 
dial her friend’s number when her phone fell 
by her feet. Alex scrambled to get her phone 
when she heard a loud beep and crash, 
throwing her forward out onto the hood of 
her car. Alex felt the sharp shooting pain of 
glass cutting through her skin on her arms, 
head, and chest as she went through the 
windshield. She told us that blood covered 
her entire face and began soaking into her 
clothes. Alex’s friend, who was still on 
speakerphone, heard the car crash and 
started screaming to see if Alex was okay. 
Alex could hear her friend calling her name 
but she could not answer her. This friend, 
Stacy, told reporters she was talking with 
Alex when suddenly she heard a loud crash 
and Alex’s screams. Stacy knew something 
must have gone wrong and tried to call out 
for Alex before calling 911. Soon after, Alex 
told us she began to hear the sound of sirens 
and was able to whisper the words, “help 
me.” Alex tried to roll off the car but she 
was immobilized by pain she inflicted from 
the accident. Every time she tried to wiggle 
out of the car the tiny shards of glass that lay 
around her also cut her. Alex attempted to 
answer the emergency crew’s questions but 
was exhausted by the pain. Sam, a member 
of the emergency crew who helped Alex off 
of her car, stated that Alex stayed conscious 
throughout the entire process and cooperated 
with them as best as she could. In total, Alex 
had suffered a sprained neck, broken arm, 
sprained wrist, a severe concussion, and was 
given multiple stiches to her head, arms and 
legs. Alex spent a week in the hospital 
before she could get back to work. We 
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caught up with Alex after she was 
discharged from the hospital. She told our 
reporters that she hopes others will learn 
from her accident by wearing their seatbelts, 
staying off their phones, and most 
importantly stressed, “don’t rush and drive. 
Being late is better than being hospitalized 
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Appendix D 
Study 1 Encoding Question 
You will now be asked to answer questions about what you have read so far. Click next to 
continue. 
(Next) 
Alex developed PTSD as a result of this accident. Which of the following explanations do 
you think is most likely WHY she developed PTSD: 
1. Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the sound of the other car’s horn 
honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the pain of the glass cutting 
into her skin, etc.,). 
2. Alex focused on how the accident happened and why it happened to her (i.e., she was 
rushing, she went through the windshield because she did not have her seatbelt on, she 
dropped her phone and took her eyes off the road and that’s why she did not see someone 
hit her, etc.,).  
3. It does not matter what Alex focused on during the accident.  
 Appendix E 
Study 1 Confidence Rating and Explanation 
Please rate your confidence in your response on the scale below.  
1               2               3            4                5                6               7              8                 9               
10 
Not at all Confident                                                                     Completely Confident 
 
Please Use the Additional Space Below to Explain Your Choice: 






Study 1 Debriefing 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The goal of this study is to survey if people have a 
belief about how encoding, or how memories are processed and stored during traumatic 
experiences. We are also interested in whether or not people believe how someone encodes a 
traumatic event, effects their PTSD symptomology.  Because this study relies on participant’s 
reporting their beliefs about traumatic memories and PTSD symptoms, it is important that you do 
not talk about this study or share the goal of the study with any others who may take it. If you 
have any further questions or concerns about this study, you can contact the following:  Kelsey 
Barnett: Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu or  Dr. Deryn Strange: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu. Thank 
you again for your participation! 
Appendix G  
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Appendix H 
 
STAI-I Question Examples 
We are unable to provide the entire manual because it would need to be purchased in order to see 
the full scale and items.1 
Directions: A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, are given 
on the following pages. Read each statement and then select the appropriate button to indicate 
how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your 
present feelings best. 
Not at all - Somewhat - Moderately so - Very much so    
I feel at ease.*       
I feel upset.* 
Directions: A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, are given 
on the following pages. Read each statement and then select the appropriate button to 
indicate how you generally feel. 
Almost never - Sometimes - Often - Almost always       
I lack self-confidence.* 
I am a steady person.* 
Gender  Male  Female* 
Age: * 
Items marked by * are required. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Retrieved From http://www.mindgarden.com/145-state-trait-anxiety-inventory-for-
adults#horizontalTab2	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Appendix I 











                                              
Appendix J 
                                              Study 2 Session 1 Informed Consent 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of 
Psychology.  CONSENT TO PARTICPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT  
Project Title:  The Strategic Use of Resources During Traumatic Experiences   
 Principal Investigator:  Deryn M. Strange, PhD Associate Professor John Jay College 524 
West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 (212) 484-1345      
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Introduction/Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is conducted 
under the direction of Dr. Deryn Strange, an Assistant Professor at John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice, USA, and Dr. Melanie Takarangi, a lecturer at the School of Psychology at Flinders.  We 
are interested in the psychological effects of exposure to stress and emotion (in this case, 
stressful photos), and particularly how the strategic use of resources while exposed to the 
material effects mood and level of distress.  
Procedures: Approximately 2000 individuals are expected to participate in this study. If you 
agree to participate in this study, you will participate in two online sessions. In both sessions you 
will be shown a series of photographs, and asked some questions regarding the content of the 
photos and what you thought about the photos. You will also be asked to do a task assessing your 
thinking and attention. The first session will take approximately 45-60 minutes. The second 
session will take place a week later. It will take approximately 15 - 30 minutes. Please be aware 
that you can ask to stop the experiment at any time without penalty—please contact the 
researcher. You are also free to withdraw from the study, at any point before the end of the 
session, or to decline to answer particular questions.    
Possible Discomforts and Risks: It is important to note that in this study, you will be asked to 
view a large number of emotional images, some of which may be very graphic and very negative 
(e.g. burns, sexual and physical violence, torture, maltreatment, and death) in nature. Some 
people may find these images distressing. Please do not proceed if you do not want to view such 
images. A small minority of people also experience distressing memories and reactions in the 
week after viewing the photos although these reactions generally subside quite quickly.  Please 
DO NOT participate in this study if you think that you may be adversely affected by viewing the 
photos, or if for example you have been a victim of sexual or physical violence, serious injury 
	   63	  
(burns, car accident, etc).    
Benefits: There are no direct benefits from participating in this study. However, participating in 
the study may increase general knowledge of the impact of trauma.    
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not 
to participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled.   If you decide to leave the study, please contact the principal investigator, Deryn 
Strange, to inform them of your decision. You may refuse to answer any specific questions or 
refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study.    
Financial Considerations: Participation in this study will involve no cost you. For your 
participation in this study you will receive four research credits after you complete Session 2.    
Confidentiality: The data obtained from you will be collected via digital and written document. 
The collected data will be accessible to the Principle Investigator – Dr. Deryn Strange, Dr. 
Melanie Takarangi, and her research assistants. The researcher will protect your confidentiality 
by labeling your data with a participant number, which will not be tied with your name. You will 
never be identified in our research project or in any other presentation or publication. Your 
videotapes data will be coded following the experiment and erased. The collected data will be 
stored in paper and digital format in a locked and secured laboratory.  In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your coded data may be shared with 
other competent researchers. Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.        
Contact Questions/Persons: If you have any questions about the research now or in the future, 
you should contact the Principal Investigator, Deryn Strange (email: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu). If 
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you have any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the 
John Jay Human Research Protection Program Office at jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu, or (212) 237-
8961.   In the event of any problems resulting from participation in the study, please contact one 
of the following agencies: The National Center for Victims of Crime, link victims with a variety 
of important services, including crisis intervention, information, counseling, and support groups. 
Phone:1-800-FYI-CALL or 1-800-211-7996 Web:http://www.ncvc.org/  National Sexual Assault 
Hotline for services such as counseling, therapy, support groups, and advocacy. Phone:1-800-
656-4673 Web:http://www.rainn.org   Safe Helpline for sexual assault support for military 
personnel. Phone:1-877-995-5247 Web:http://www.safehelpline.org/   Safe Horizon for victims 
of violence Phone:1-800-621-4673 Web:http://www.safehorizon.org   National Center for PTSD 
Phone:1-800-273-8255 Web:http://www.ptsd.va.gov    
	   65	  
m Statement of Consent:  “I have read the above description of this research and I understand 
it.  I have been informed of the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction.  Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that 
I may have will also be answered by the principal investigator of the research study.  I 
voluntary agree to participate in this study.   By clicking the “yes” box I agree to participate 
in the study.  I agree to participate. ( ).  
Session 2 Informed Consent 
Welcome back! 
m I agree to participate (1) 
ID Please enter your participant ID below. Note: Your participant ID for this study is the letter 
"A" followed by your ID number, which could be found on CunyFirst in the Student Center. 
During this experiment, we ask that you comply with the following experiment requirements:  1) 
Please maximize the size of your web browser so that it covers your entire screen.  2) Please 
complete the experiment in a single session, and do not leave the experiment to engage in other 
tasks. So don't check your mail, look at Facebook, send or read a text message, get up for a 
drink, etc. 3) Please do not use your web browser's back or refresh buttons at any point during 
the experiment.  4) Because this experiment requires your close attention, we ask that you 
complete the experiment in an environment that is free of noise and distraction. Please do not 
speak to anyone, or have anyone near you. Because of the nature of the images that will be 
shown, we ask that you be alone in a quiet room.  Thank you for your help with these matters. 
Continue to the next page when you're ready to begin. 
Please wait while the experiment is prepared... 
Appendix K 
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      Study 2 Debriefing 
Debriefing Information: Dear participant, Thank you for your participation in this 
study. This debriefing is given as an opportunity for you to learn more about this research 
project, how your participation plays a part in this research, and why this research may be 
important to society.  Please do not discuss this study with anyone else who might also 
participate in the future.  Knowledge about the study may influence their responses and, 
essentially, invalidate the information obtained from them.  (For this same reason it is important 
that you tell the experimenter if you knew details about this study before participating.) This is 
part of your responsibilities as a research participant. We originally told you we were interested 
in evaluating the impact of self-relevance on responses to graphic material. We were actually 
most interested in whether you had intrusive thoughts about the photos you viewed. Specifically, 
we were interested in whether experiencing intrusive thoughts can adversely affect peoples’ 
memory about the photos. We hope you understand why we did not tell you about the true 
purpose of our study until now. For example, if you were aware that there would be a memory 
test, you would have changed your viewing behavior and would not have been fooled, and we 
would be no closer to understanding traumatic memory. It is likely that the results of this 
research will be presented at academic conferences and/or published as an article in a 
journal.  Again, your individual responses will be kept confidential during this process.  If you 
are interested in the results of this study or if you have any additional questions or comments, 
please contact Dr. Melanie Takarangi by email at melanie.takarangi@flinders.edu.au. Please 
click Next. 
 
 
 
 
